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“LOCKER ROOM TALK” OR SEXUAL HARASSMENT? THE PUSH
FOR A FEDERAL MODIFICATION OF THE SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
STANDARD

Janine Dayeh*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’
as a reply to this tweet,” actress Alyssa Milano tweeted. 1 As
hundreds of thousands of people began posting #MeToo, the
significant social movement shed light on the prevalence of
sexual harassment in the workplace. 2 #MeToo exposed the gaps
in sexual harassment legislation and mobilized support for
protective lawmaking at both the state and federal levels. 3
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 4 In 1980, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) amended its
guidelines to include sexual harassment as a form of sex
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1 Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 4:21 PM),
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976.
2
See Brianna Messina, Redefining Reasonableness: Supervisory Harassment
Claims in the Era of #MeToo, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1061, 1062–64 (2020) (discussing
the effects of the #MeToo movement on reporting and awareness of workplace
harassment).
3 Id. at 1087–88.
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 5 Sexual harassment
under Title VII is actionable because of its discriminatory nature
against protected classes. 6
There are two types of harassment recognized under Title
VII: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. 7
This
Comment will focus on hostile work environment claims. 8 To
make a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, the victim
must show that: (1) they belong to a protected class under the
law; (2) the harassment experienced was based on sex; (3) the
harassment was unwelcome; (4) the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive “to alter the conditions of [the victim’s]
employment” and create an abusive working environment; and
(5) the plaintiff subjectively views, and a reasonable person would
also objectively view, the work environment as hostile or abusive. 9
While the “severe or pervasive” standard has long governed
hostile work environment claims, both under Title VII and in
many state legislative counterparts, the #MeToo movement
sparked a desire to revisit this demanding standard. 10 For
example, California amended its anti-discrimination law in 2018
to allow a lower threshold for bringing a hostile work
environment claim. 11 In 2019, New York similarly passed antisexual harassment legislation that allows workers to bring
harassment suits resulting from conduct that in the past would
5
EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment (1990),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/policy-guidance-current-issues-sexualharassment.
6
Anna I. Burke, "It Wasn't That Bad": The Necessity of Social Framework
Evidence in Use of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 105 IOWA L. REV. 771, 775
(2020) (sexual harassment qualifies as sex discrimination).
7
See Rachel Farkas et al., State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, 20 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 421, 426 (2019) (“Quid pro quo harassment occurs when the
submission to or rejection of requests for sexual favors is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting an individual”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Id. at 427 (discussing the types of claims actionable under Title VII).
9
Id. at 427; see also Christine J. Back & Wilson C. Freeman, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45155, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND TITLE VII: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2–3
n.10 (2018).
10
See generally Andrea Johnson, Kathryn Menefee, & Ramya Sekaran,
Progress in Advancing Me Too Workplace Reforms in #20StatesBy2020, NAT’L
WOMEN’S L. CTR., 10 (Dec. 2019), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/
final_2020States_Report-12.20.19-v2.pdf (discussing victim-friendly reforms
adopted by a variety of states) [hereinafter Women’s Law Ctr. ].
11 Women’s Law Ctr., supra note 10, at 10.
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not likely satisfy the severe or pervasive burden. 12 Specifically,
the law expanded protections to a broader class of employees
and eased the burden of persuasion. 13 Anti-discrimination
legislation, such as those discussed, is long overdue; however,
passed laws remain inadequate due to their limited jurisdictional
nature and, often, lack of retroactive coverage. 14 Moreover,
despite attempts by many state legislatures to modify their antidiscrimination standards, state courts in these jurisdictions
continue to blindly apply the severe or pervasive standard. 15
The severe or pervasive standard is outdated and
inefficient. 16 States should follow in the footsteps of New York
and California by adopting a more inclusive standard, one that
recognizes all forms of sexual harassment as actionable. 17 Many
are skeptical of the validity of sexual harassment claims until they
fall victim to an offender’s wrongdoing. 18 This skepticism blocks
the path to relief for victims, as their experiences are often
belittled by judges who quantify the victims suffering based on an
employer-friendly standard. 19 This distrust of victims discourages
reporting, which leads to impunity for harassers. All these factors
12
13
14

Women’s Law Ctr., supra note 10, at 10–11.
Women’s Law Ctr., supra note 10, at 10–11.
See, e.g., Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 17 Civ. 3479 (KPF), 2019 WL

4081898, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019) (holding that the bill’s effective date is
October 11, 2019).
15
See Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to
California as a Model, 128 YALE L. J. F. 121, 144 (2018).

16
See A Call for Legislative Action to Eliminate Workplace Harassment:
Principles and Priorities, ACLU 1, 3 (Dec. 2018), https://www.aclu.org/

sites/default/files/field_document/workplace_harassment_legislative_principles_10.1
5.18.pdf (proposing that congress should “[a]ddress the judicially created ‘severe or
pervasive’ liability standard so as to correct and prevent unduly restrictive
interpretations by the courts that minimize and ignore the impact of harassment”).
17 See Cal. Gov't Code § 12923; N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(h).
18
See Beverly Engel, Why Don't Victims of Sexual Harassment Come Forward
Sooner?, PSYCH. TODAY (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/
blog/the-compassion-chronicles/201711/why-dont-victims-sexual-harassment-comeforward-sooner.
19 Alexia Campbell, How the Legal System Fails Victims of Sexual Harassment,
VOX (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/11/
16685778/sexual-harassment-federal-courts (“federal judges across the country
(who are mostly men) have developed an extremely narrow interpretation of what
sexual harassment is under the law, and which behaviors create a hostile work
environment. Repeated groping, sexual propositions, and sexualized comments at
work usually don't meet that high standard”).
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demonstrate the need for a standard that recognizes all instances
of harassment as just that—harassment. By continuing to adhere
to the severe or pervasive standard, victims’ careers will suffer
further, harassers will continue their predatory behavior without
accountability, and the progress of the #MeToo movement will
go to waste.
Part II of this comment addresses the current severe or
pervasive standard set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 20 and the development of
sexual harassment law in recent decades. Part III examines state
modifications of this standard, incorporating cases that likely
would have been decided differently had the stringent severe or
pervasive requirement been abolished. Part IV analyzes the
implementation of these reformed thresholds, addressing
emerging case law that applies less onerous standards than the
traditional Meritor standard.
There, I argue that state
modifications, though a significant improvement in sexual
harassment law, are still not inclusive enough and that a binding,
plaintiff-friendly federal standard is necessary to protect victims.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Federal Bringing an End to
Harassment by Enhancing Accountability and Rejecting
Discrimination in the Workplace Act (“BE HEARD” or “the
Act”), 21 proposed in Congress but ultimately rejected, should be
pursued again because it better encompasses problematic
behavior that continues to serve as a barrier to victim
advancement. By setting a threshold that allows for less judicial
deference, case law governing hostile work environment claims
will become more uniform, and harassers will be held
accountable for their inexcusable acts.

477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
Bringing an End to Harassment by Enhancing Accountability and Rejecting
Discrimination in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204 (2019)
[hereinafter “the Act”].
20
21
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THE HISTORY OF THE SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
STANDARD

The laws and systems currently in place to address
harassment are inadequate. Sexual harassment need not be
“sexual.” 22 It can “include conduct of a sexual nature, such as
requests for sexual favors or unwanted verbal or physical sexual
advances, and it can occur regardless of whether the harasser
claims to be sexually attracted to the victim.” 23 Moreover, women
are not the only victims; men, particularly those who do not
conform to masculine norms, can also be targets of sexual
harassment. 24 Similarly, women can also be harassers. 25 It is well
recognized, however, that women are especially susceptible to
sexual harassment, and despite “under-reporting, approximately
60% of female employees . . . have experienced at least one
specific instance of sexually harassing behavior, such as unwanted
sexual attention or sexual coercion.” 26
See Kristen N. Colleta, Sexual Harassment on Social Media: Why Traditional
Company Sexual Harassment Policies Are Not Enough and How To Fix It, 48
22

SETON HALL L. REV. 449, 450 (2018) (“For example, ‘offensive remarks about a
person's sex’ can result in a sexual harassment claim”); see also Judith J. Johnson,

License To Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment To
Be "Severe Or Pervasive" Discriminates Among "Terms And Conditions" Of
Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 135 (2003) (“The other type of sexual harassment

does not involve sexual conduct, but rather would cover such conduct as derogatory
comments about a person's gender”).
23
NEW YORK CITY COMM’N ON HUM. RTS. & SEXUALITY & GENDER L. CLINIC AT
COLUM. L. SCH., COMBATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON 2017 PUBLIC HEARING TESTIMONY, NEW YORK CITY
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2017) [hereinafter NYC COMMISSION].
24 Aleiza Durana et al., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A SEVERE AND PERVASIVE PROBLEM
6 (2018),
http://newamericadotorg.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Sexual_Harassment_A_Sev
ere_and_Pervasive_Problem_2018-09-25_152914.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
25
Id.; See Ramya Sekaran, Congress Finally Introduces Groundbreaking
Workplace Harassment Legislation For the Rest of Us, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.
(Apr. 9, 2019). https://nwlc.org/blog/congress-finally-introduces-groundbreakingworkplace-harassment-legislation-for-the-rest-of-us/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2022)
(recognizing that while workers in virtually every industry experience harassment
and discrimination, low wage workers and women in male-dominated fields are
especially vulnerable.).
26
NYC COMMISSION, supra note 23 (citing CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A.
LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUD.
OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/select-task-forcestudy-harassment-workplace (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
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Against this backdrop, the United States Supreme Court set
out the standard to evaluate claims of sexual harassment in
Meritor, where Vinson, an employee at Meritor Savings Bank,
was fired from her position for “excessive use” of sick leave. 27
Vinson brought an action against Meritor Savings Bank and the
bank’s vice president, Sidney Taylor, claiming that Taylor
sexually harassed her on multiple occasions throughout her fouryear term of employment. 28 Vinson testified that the first
instance of harassment occurred when Taylor invited her out to
dinner and pressured her to have sexual relations, which she
agreed to out of fear of losing her job. 29 Following this incident,
Vinson further alleged that Taylor repeatedly demanded sexual
favors, “fondled her in front of other employees, followed her
into the women’s restroom when she went there alone, exposed
himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several
occasions.” 30 Vinson did not report this misconduct out of fear of
Taylor and termination. 31 Taylor denied all allegations and
suggested that the action was a response to a business-related
dispute. 32
The district court denied relief, finding that any sexual
activity between the pair was voluntary and that Vinson therefore
could not be a victim of sexual harassment. 33 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
district court’s ruling and remanded the case, reasoning that if
the evidence demonstrated that “Taylor made Vinson’s toleration
of sexual harassment a condition of her employment,” her
voluntariness was not material. 34 As such, the court held that
Vinson raised a valid claim under Title VII predicated on the
existence of a hostile work environment. 35

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id.
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The Supreme Court, recognizing that a hostile work
environment violates Title VII, affirmed the circuit court’s
holding. 36 The Court found that Vinson raised a sufficient claim
for hostile work environment sexual harassment because her
supervisor’s actions constituted pervasive harassment. 37
In
support of its ruling, the Court declared that a hostile work
environment may only violate Title VII where the harassment is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and to create an abusive working environment. 38
Since recognizing a cause of action for hostile work
environment claims, the Supreme Court has continued to clarify
the standard. 39 For example, seven years after Meritor, the Court
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 40 expanded the definition of a
discriminatorily hostile work environment by specifying the types
of injuries sufficient to support a claim. 41 The case involved a
claim raised by Harris, a manager at Forklift, who faced genderbased insults and unwanted sexual innuendos. 42 Specifically,
Forklift’s Systems President, Hardy, made multiple derogatory
comments toward Harris, such as “‘you’re a woman, what do you
know’ and . . . ‘dumb ass woman.’” 43 Although Harris had
complained to Hardy about his conduct and was assured said
conduct would cease, the verbal harassment continued, ultimately
leading to her resignation. 44 Harris thereafter brought an action
36 Id. at 64 (specifying that “sexual harassment” is a form of sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII).
37
Id. at 66–67 (“plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”).
38 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66–67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.3d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)) ; see also L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social
Movement or a Legal Movement Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL 'Y J. 321, 330 n.33
(citing Cockrell v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Bd., No. 7:17-cv-00333-LSC, 2018 WL
1627811, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2018)) (finding that the “severe or pervasive”
standard was enacted to ensure claims of harassment represent real harm to
claimants, as well as to distinguish between what the court views as merely
“offensive” behavior and behavior which is “abusive.”).
39 See Johnson, supra note 22, at 98.
40 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
41 See Johnson, supra note 22, at 98–99 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 17, 19–23).
42 Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
43
44

Id.
Id.
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asserting that Hardy’s conduct had created a hostile work
environment. 45
The district court held that, although “a close case,” Hardy’s
conduct did not constitute an abusive working environment
because it did not create an “environment so poisoned as to be
intimidating or abusive to [Harris].” 46 The court reasoned that
while some of Hardy’s comments “offended [Harris], and would
offend the reasonable woman,” they were not “so severe as to be
expected to seriously affect [Harris’] psychological well-being,”
nor sufficiently pervasive to interfere with work performance. 47
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding it was
improper for the district court to solely rely upon the presence of
psychological injury and that, instead, a court must consider all
the surrounding circumstances when determining whether an
environment is hostile. 48 The Court reaffirmed the severe or
pervasive standard, noting that it “takes a middle path between
making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.” 49
The Court also dismissed the notion that analyzing hostile work
environment claims can be “a mathematically precise test.” 50
Courts cannot apply generalized factors when analyzing sexual
harassment claims because each victim’s experience is
individualized––instead, there must be a holistic analysis of each
distinct claim. 51
Justice Ginsburg concurred in Harris, agreeing that the
Court’s inquiry should center on “whether the discriminatory
conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work
performance.” 52 In Justice Ginsburg’s view, a plaintiff need not

45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id. at 19–20 (alteration in original).
Harris, 510 U.S. at 20 (alterations in original).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 21; see also id. at 23 (“Psychological harm, like any other relevant

factor, may be taken into account,” but “no single factor is required.”).
50 Id. at 22.
51 See Farkas et al., supra note 7, at 451 (citing 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(b)) (“Because
of the subjective nature of these terms, the EEOC guidelines recommend that
courts assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was
severity or pervasiveness based on individual facts of a case.”).
52 Harris , 510 U.S. at 24–25.
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individually prove that their tangible productivity has declined. 53
Rather, it should “suffice[] to prove that a reasonable person
subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find . . . that the
harassment so altered working conditions as to ‘make it more
difficult to do the job.’” 54
The majority in Harris further explained that the standard
of review is both objective and subjective, meaning that courts
must consider how the harasser’s behavior would be viewed by a
reasonable person and how the harasser’s behavior was
individually viewed by the plaintiff. 55
The Court further
instructed that when assessing the objective portion of a
plaintiff’s claim, courts should assume the perspective of the
reasonable victim. 56 Following the Harris decision, the majority
of lower courts apply the standard proposed by the Supreme
Court; however, some courts stray from this standard, instead
opting to apply a reasonable woman standard. 57 The Court has
not yet clarified the correct standard for analyzing the objective
component of a hostile work environment claim. 58
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp
demonstrates that requiring an objective prong in the analysis

53
54

Id.
Id. (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir.

1988)).
55
Farkas et al., supra note 7, at 451; see also Back & Freeman, supra note 9,
at 3 (finding that “the plaintiff subjectively viewed the harassment as creating an
abusive work environment; and a reasonable person would also objectively view the
work environment as abusive. This last objective prong typically constitutes the
most probing aspect of the analysis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000); see also
Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, supra note 5, at Section
C1 (noting that “a ‘reasonable person’ standard also should be applied to be a more
basic determination of whether challenged conduct is of a sexual nature.”).
57
Burke, supra note 6, at 774; but see Policy Guidance on Current Issues of
Sexual Harassment, supra note 5, at Section C1 (stating that “the reasonable
person standard should consider the victim’s perspective and not stereotyped
notions of acceptable behavior.”).
58
See Burke, supra note 6, at 781–82 (“In Harris, the Supreme Court used a
reasonable person standard to determine the objective hostility of a work
environment. Following Harris, some lower courts” modified the inquiry
depending on who the reasonable person in question was due to gendered
perceptions of sexual harassment. “The Supreme Court has not rejected the use of
the reasonable woman standard for Title VII cases.”).
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can lead to the minimization of a victim’s experiences. 59 There,
an employee testified as to her subjective belief that her
workplace environment was both sexist and offensive; however,
the Seventh Circuit found the workplace as a whole insufficiently
severe or pervasive. 60 Throughout her employment, Amy Swyear
was subjected to an unprofessional environment. 61 Swyear met
Scott, an outside sales representative, at a county fair to meet
with customers. 62 After completing work at the fair, Swyear was
forced to stay with Scott for “additional training,” and reserved
two separate rooms in a hotel. 63 Scott repeatedly touched
Swyear’s arm, placed his hand on her lower back, and stood close
to her. 64 “Scott had three beers during dinner and told Swyear
several times that he was single,” and later demonstrated signs of
intoxication. 65 Upon arriving at their rooms, Scott made his way
into Swyear’s room, crawled into Swyear’s bed, and asked her to
be a “cuddle buddy.” 66 Despite declining and asking him to
leave, Scott returned and knocked several more times on
Swyear’s door. 67 Later, Swyear reported the incident to her
superior, who decided that no discipline was warranted; Swyear
was eventually terminated. 68
The Seventh Circuit articulated that in considering the
objective offensiveness of a work environment, courts should
consider “the severity of the conduct, its frequency, whether it is
merely offensive as opposed to physically threatening or
humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with an
employee’s work performance.” 69 The court held that Swyear
failed to establish that Scott’s conduct was objectively offensive
because the conduct was merely “crude and immature,” rather

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

911 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2018).
See Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp, 911 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 878.
Id. at 879.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Swyear, 911 F.3d at 879.
Id.
Id. at 879–80.
Id. at 881 (quoting Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2018)).
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than pervasively hostile. 70
The Seventh Circuit exclusively considered whether the
environment as a whole was hostile, without assessing the severity
of the impact on Swyear herself, thus belittling her trauma and
providing her supervisor with the ability to continue to expose
her to an unsafe work environment. Swyear reflects how
pronounced the gaps are in the federal system, as judges
continue to belittle a victim’s experience by determining that
claims are not severe enough. While the federal scheme
appropriately provides for an objective consideration of a
plaintiff’s claim, the issue lies in the abundance of discretion
provided to the courts in making that determination, which has
ultimately led to inconsistent results. What may be considered
objectively offensive to one judge might not be offensive to
another. This Comment advocates for the adoption of uniform
guidelines that embody a lower threshold in an effort to combat
arbitrary results and validate victims’ experiences.
Notwithstanding which standard courts apply, conduct that
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment is beyond the scope of Title VII. 71
When faced with conduct that does not meet that rigid standard,
many courts have used the stringent language to effectively deem
harmful conduct permissible. 72 For example, a supervisor raping
an employee has, perhaps not surprisingly, consistently been
viewed as “severe” enough to meet the bar even though the claim
is based upon a single crime. 73 But, in other instances, a single
incident does not meet the threshold, such as when physical
contact is not “bad” enough, or if the action does not involve
70
Id. (“Although we recognize the environment at Fare Foods was at times
inappropriate and offensive, we do not believe [plaintiff] has met [the severe or
pervasive standard].”).
71 See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000).
72
See Johnson, supra note 22, at 85–86; see also Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A.
Thomas, Boss Grab your Breasts? That’s not (Legally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINION (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/harassmentemployees-laws-.html; Back & Freeman, supra note 9, at 3 (“Failure to show
sufficient severity or pervasiveness, under the objective prong of the analysis, is
often the basis for dismissal of a Title VII harassment claim.”).
73 See Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983-84 (7th Cir. 2008) (co-worker rape
was sufficiently severe to constitute actionable harassment under Title VII).
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physical threats. 74 Yet, a wide range of other problematic and
harmful conduct often does not meet either threshold, such as if
a supervisor asks an employee out on a date once and treats her
differently if she declines. 75 Accordingly, an abusive work
environment, even one that does not impact psychological wellbeing, “often will detract from employees’ job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them
from advancing in their careers,” and therefore should fall within
Title VII’s purview. 76
The problem with the federal scheme is that it continues to
dismiss improper conduct in the name of not meeting the
threshold. When conduct is rendered not serious enough to
meet the standard, victims are left without a remedy. Harassers’
misconduct cannot continue to be pushed under the rug and
excused, as the federal system fails to encompass a wide variety of
harassment that harms women. Women are forced to either
leave their positions to evade their harassers or must work in an
environment that is not conducive to their success and
advancement. The standard is far too permissive, as it minimizes
bad behavior under the guise of outdated understandings of
professionalism and workplace interactions.

See Paul v. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 309 F. App'x 825, 826 (5th Cir.
2009) (affirming a district court ruling that a single ninety-second incident of a
male foreman going chest to chest with a female plaintiff and rubbing pelvic region
across her hips and buttocks was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute an
actionable Title VII claim); Guerrero v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 254 F. App'x 865,
867 (2d Cir. 2007)
where the sex-related conduct complained of was principally
name calling, no single incident was sufficiently severe to give rise
to a cause of action . . . [w]e think it important . . . that Guerrero
alleges no physical touching or threats, no interference with her
work performance, and no overt sexual advances. If she proffered
evidence to support a finding that she had suffered that sort of
harassment, the analysis as to whether it was severe or pervasive
might well be different.
75
Sperino & Thomas, supra note 72; see also Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment, supra note 5 (“A ‘hostile environment’ claim generally
requires a showing of a pattern of offensive conduct.”).
76
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); see Policy Guidance on
Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, supra note 5.
74
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STATE MODIFICATIONS

Many state courts look to Title VII and its interpretations
when determining the validity of hostile work environment
claims under state anti-discrimination law. 77 Yet, states like
California and New York have gone beyond the federal standard
by enacting legislation that employs greater protections for
victims of sexual harassment. 78
Specifically, the California
legislature enacted Section 12923 of its anti-discrimination code
in January of 2019, declaring the state’s intent regarding the
application of the laws against harassment. 79 In doing so, the
legislature expressly stated that a “single incident of harassing
conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the
existence of a hostile work environment.” 80 If the harassing
conduct interferes with the employee’s work performance or
creates “an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment[,]” then an employee may pursue a valid sexual
harassment claim. 81
California’s approach adopts the reasoning proposed by
Justice Ginsburg in her Harris concurrence, as it involves an
objective inquiry into whether a reasonable person would be
injured by the altered working conditions. 82 According to the
legislature, the purpose of these new laws is “to provide all
Californians with an equal opportunity to succeed in the
workplace and should be applied accordingly by the courts.” 83
The legislature rejected the reasoning of Brooks v. City of San
Mateo, which previously controlled in the Ninth Circuit. 84 In
rejecting that approach, California declared that the opinion
Carol Schultz Vento, When is Work Environment Intimidating, Hostile or
Offensive, So As To Constitute Sexual Harassment Under State Law, 93 A.L.R.5th
77

47, 2 (2022).
78 See Cal. Gov't Code § 12923; see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.
79 Cal. Gov't Code § 12923.
80
81
82
83

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

84 229 F.3d 917, 926 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Utilizing the Harris factors of frequency,
severity and intensity of interference with working conditions, we cannot say that a
reasonable woman in Brooks’ position would consider the terms and conditions of
her employment altered by Selvaggio's actions.”).
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shall no longer be used to determine what kind of conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute an actionable claim. 85
California’s anti-discrimination reforms, while optimal on
paper, have not been implemented effectively. California courts
have not only retained the severe or pervasive standard but also
disregarded the enhanced protections that Section 12923
provides. 86 For example, in Jackson v. Pepperdine Univ., 87 the
appellant asserted that the respondent made two highly offensive
remarks that “were sufficiently severe to have had such an effect
on a reasonable woman in her position.” 88 There, the appellate
court upheld the trial court’s ruling and applied the incorrect
severe or pervasive standard, holding that both before and after
the enactment of Section 12923, “the totality of the circumstances
Jackson alleged do not reflect conduct sufficiently severe to
constitute actionable sexual harassment.” 89
Case law in New York fared differently. 90 On August 12,
2019, Governor Cuomo signed SB 6577 into law, which amended
the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) by creating
new protections and enhancing already existing protections
against sexual harassment. 91 Before the amendment, a plaintiff
claiming a hostile work environment based on discrimination in
violation of the NYSHRL was required to show that the
workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.” 92 The new law completely discarded the
severe or pervasive requirement. 93 Now, under New York law,
85
86

Id.; see also Cal Gov Code § 12923.
See Jackson v. Pepperdine Univ., No. B296411, 2020 Cal. App. Unpub.

LEXIS 5719, at *2 (Sep. 1, 2020).
87
88
89
90

Id.
Id.
Id.
See S. 6577, 2019–20 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/

legislation/bills/2019/s6577.
91
92

2020).

Id.

Reichman v. City of N.Y., 179 A.D.3d 1115, 1118 (App. Div. 2nd Dept.

93
Russell Penzer, New York Breaks from Federal Sexual Harassment
Standards, N.Y.L.J.: ANALYSIS (Oct. 4, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.law.com/

newyorklawjournal/2019/10/04/new-york-breaks-from-federal-sexual-harassment-
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the employer must prove that a “reasonable victim” would view
the conduct in question as no more than “petty slights or trivial
inconveniences.” 94 The law directs courts to construe the
NYSHRL liberally, like its New York City counterpart, 95
“regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those
laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of [the
NYSHRL], have been so construed.” 96 SB 6577 transforms sexual
harassment law in the State of New York; now, any unwanted
sexual or gender-based harassment, including isolated
comments, jokes, or gestures, may be unlawful. 97
The monumental impact of New York’s change was evident
in Petrilli v. Bd. of Educ. of the E. Rochester Union Free Sch.
Dist., where the plaintiff claimed that her colleague’s vulgar
behavior and language created a hostile work environment. 98
Although the court dismissed her claim under the severe or
pervasive standard, it took judicial notice of the amendments to
the standard in a footnote, highlighting that, under the new
Human Rights Law, the plaintiff’s claim would have been
actionable. 99 Petrilli illustrates the benefits of disregarding the
severe or pervasive standard of conduct because improper
conduct can no longer be referred to as inconsequential
rudeness. It is unclear, however, how the new standard will be
effectuated. Similar to the California opinions, few courts have
applied the lower standard to novel case law.

standards/.
94

Id.

N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-101.
96 N.Y. Exec. Law § 300.
97 See generally Penzer, supra note 93 (explaining how the reformed standard
is a substantial deviation from historical standards).
98
Petrilli v. Bd. of Educ. of the E. Rochester Union Free Sch. Dist., No.
E2019003161, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7172, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 2019).
99 Id. at *5
Nor does the frequency of the vulgar and lewd references, even if
directed at the plaintiff on account of her gender, rise to the level
of ‘pervasive.’ The conduct of the employees in the office of the
Superintendent of East Rochester school—although by today's
standards is reprehensible and utterly out of place—does not
meet the standard of egregiousness and depravity that is
contemplated by case law.
95

DAYEH (DO NOT DELETE)

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

390

5/18/2022 5:01 PM

[Vol. 46:2

Although states can enact legislation that is more restrictive
than federal statutes, some experts propose that weakening the
severe or pervasive standard will not affect the outcome of many
cases due to plaintiffs’ lawyers’ clever inclusion of state law claims
in their pleadings. 100 Additionally, state modifications may also
be inefficient in providing recourse for victims of sexual
harassment, as courts seem to cling to old norms and misapply,
or completely disregard, enhanced protections.
The next section addresses the gaps in protection for victims
and proposes that uniformity among courts in the context of
sexual harassment can best be achieved by implementing a more
easily applied standard.
The enactment of the Act, in
conjunction with widespread state modifications to the
substantive standards in sexual harassment law, will provide this
solution.
IV.

THE PRESSING NEED FOR A NATIONAL MODIFICATION

A. The Harmful Effects of Insufficient Standards
The severe or pervasive standard is outdated and
underinclusive because it enables courts to disregard victims’
injuries. The disparity in the case law is far too great under the
current standard, which creates a gap in federal protections. 101
While the severe or pervasive standard may have worked under
the societal norms of the last century, reasonableness standards
are meant to update and should not “entrench norms from
another time.” 102 Despite the increased intolerance of sexual
Erik A Christiansen, How Are the Laws Sparked by #MeToo Affecting
Harassment?,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(May 8,
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/featuredarticles/2020/new-state-laws-expand-workplace-protections-sexual-harassmentvictims/ (explaining that lawyers can avoid the severe and pervasive standard by
“pleading state law claims for assault, battery, negligent hiring, and negligent
supervision.”).
101
Kenneth R. Davis, Strong Medicine: Fighting the Sexual Harassment
Pandemic, 79 OHIO ST. L. J. 1057, 1103 (2018) (explaining that the standard needs
to be lower to condemn behavior that would be highly offensive to unbiased
observers without overreach, stating “[t]he occasional salacious joke, insult, or
provocative remark may be boorish, but most reasonable people would not find
such misbehavior highly offensive.”).
102
Joan C. Williams et al., What's Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law
After the Norm Cascade, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 139, 154 (2019).
100

Workplace
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misconduct and harassment in light of #MeToo, many courts
have failed to update their understanding of these types of
claims. Instead, courts rely on outdated standards and norms
that focus on patriarchal notions and protect employers instead
of victims. 103 The Act can help address this problem by providing
a national solution that is more reflective of current norms and
values.
The case law governing hostile work environment claims is
blatantly inconsistent. 104 Judges often interpret the standard as
“severe and pervasive,” which “elevates the severity of the
conduct to a really unconscionable level” even though the
Supreme Court originally intended the standard to be
disjunctive. 105 For example, in Hannigan-Haas v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 106 the senior vice president of the plaintiff’s
employer asked her to accompany him to his office where he
later sexually assaulted her, only stopping when the plaintiff was
able to break free and run from the room. 107 While this sexual
assault was rendered sufficiently severe, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that it
nevertheless was not enough to constitute sexual harassment
because it only occurred once and was, therefore, not “pervasive”
enough to meet the standard. 108 This was a clear misuse of an
already impenetrable standard.
In an attempt to avoid further misapplication, the Seventh
Circuit restated the Meritor standard in Cerros v. Steel Techs.,
Inc. 109 In 2005, the Seventh Circuit clarified that “conduct that
is either pervasive or severe may give rise to a hostile work
103
104

See id.
See Back & Freeman, supra note 9, at 3 (“Courts repeatedly note the

difficulty of assessing whether harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive
under Harris to amount to a Title VII violation.”).
105
Anna Gronewold, Lawmakers Focus On Setting New Standard For Sexual
Harassment, POLITICO (May 24, 2019), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/
albany/story/2019/05/23/in-final-days-of-session-anti-harassment-groups-focus-onsevere-or-pervasive-standard-1029121(supporting that the Meritor standard has
proven too high for victims).
106 No. 95 C 7408, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16416 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1996).
107 Id. at *3.
108
Id. at *15; Johnson, supra note 22, at 113 (discussing a line of lower court
cases misapplying the Meritor standard and Harris Factors).
109 398 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2005).
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environment.” 110 Yet, other jurisdictions continue to apply the
wrong standard, often finding very offensive conduct “that would
amount to sexual assault under criminal statutes [not actionable]
because it is insufficiently severe or pervasive.” 111 Many courts
struggle to determine what qualifies as sufficiently severe or
pervasive conduct.
While the Supreme Court in Harris articulated factors to use
in determining whether a work environment is hostile, courts
often misapply these factors by overweighing them and
inconsistently interpreting the necessary level of “offensive.” 112
For example, in Hill-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 113 the Seventh
Circuit heard a plaintiff’s claim that her supervisor rubbed her
back, squeezed her shoulders, and stared at her chest during a
uniform inspection while telling her to raise her arms and open
her blazer. 114 The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations were
isolated incidents that, even when taken together, did not create
a hostile work environment. 115 Yet, in EEOC v. Management
Hospitality of Racine, Inc, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that three instances of
sexual harassment by a supervisor—telling her that he thought
she was “kinky” and liked it “rough,” propositioned her for sex,
and “slap groped” her buttocks—was sufficiently pervasive to
support a claim for sexual harassment. 116
The harassment that took place in Hill-Dyson and
Management Hospitality is eerily similar, both instances
demonstrate separate incidents of offensive, egregious conduct,
and yet the courts reached different results. 117
These
Id. at 950.
Johnson, supra note 22, at 111.
112 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (articulating five non-exclusive factors for use in
determining whether a work environment is unlawfully hostile or abusive including:
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The Court clarified
that the presence or absence of any of these factors was not determinative).
113 282 F.3d 456, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2002).
110
111

114

Id.

282 F.3d 456, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2002).
116 666 F.3d 422, 429 (7th Cir. 2012).
117
See Back & Freeman, supra note 9, at 6 (suggesting that controlling circuit
precedent that finds certain fact patterns to not amount to severe or pervasive
115
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inconsistencies exemplify the need for a more encompassing
federal standard that proposes clear guidelines for judges to
utilize when assessing hostile work environment claims to
promote uniformity in factually analogous scenarios. 118 If the
standard is lowered, victims that were previously unable to have
their claims heard will have their day in court. 119 There have
been many instances of sexual harassment that have been
deemed as not actionable because of the preclusive nature of the
severe or pervasive standard. 120
However, many critics say that a more inclusive national
standard may negatively affect victims because men, who are
often perceived as harassers, will shy away from interactions with
women out of fear of allegations. 121 Some studies reflect that
male behavior and interactions with the opposite sex changed in
light of the #MeToo movement, causing many women’s careers
to stagnate. 122 Surveys show that men are less willing to mentor
women, thereby adversely affecting the careers of women because
workers with mentors are more likely to be promoted. 123 These
conduct contributes to a pattern of conduct courts hold to not be severe or
pervasive).
118
Back & Freeman, supra note 9, at 5 (“Even when addressing conduct with
these characteristics, however, federal appellate case law reflects divergent analyses
based on seemingly similar facts.”).
119
See Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 81, 82–84 (1st Cir.
2006) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff asked supervisor to come on a
sales visit with her, and he responded by grabbing his crotch and stating that "it
would be great to come with you." The court held that the alleged harassing
conduct, while certainly crude, comprised only a single incident).
120
See, e.g., McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, 86
(S.D.N.Y. 2020); Gronewold, supra note 105.
121
Claire Cain Miller, It’s Not Just Mike Pence. Americans Are Wary of Being
Alone With the Opposite Sex, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/upshot/members-of-the-opposite-sex-at-workgender-study.html (discussing sentiments about holding meetings alone with
members of the other sex).
122
Ann C. McGinley, #MeToo Backlash or Simply Common Sense?: It’s
Complicated, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397, 1398 (2020) (women in McGinley’s
study argued that treating associates differently on the basis of sex “deprive[s]
female associates of the same mentoring, training, and sponsorship opportunities
as the male associates”).
123
Id. at 1407; see also Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now? What Next?,
69 DUKE L. J. 377, 415–16 (2019) (explaining that surveys conducted by Lean In
and Survey Monkey on the effects of the movement found that almost half of male
managers were uncomfortable in common workplace activities with women, such as
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negative effects on many women’s careers are present in most
professions, including the legal profession, where differential
treatment of female associates is prevalent because the number of
male partners and potential mentors exceeds the number of
female partners. 124 Therefore, some argue that the deprivation of
one-on-one interactions with superiors leaves women with no
room for advancement because they are unable to demonstrate
that they are qualified and deserving of promotions. 125
Additional evidence suggests that the stagnancy of women’s
careers directly correlates with their male superiors’ fear of the
possible consequences of interacting with them. 126 For example,
one study conducted by Ann McGinley proposed a series of
hypotheticals to participants based upon common occurrences;
one scenario involved a male partner who, when traveling to take
depositions, regularly went to dinner with male associates to
discuss strategy but refused to go out with female associates due
to the fear of potential sexual harassment accusations. 127 This is
but one hypothetical that reflects the unforgiving male
perception that interactions with females are dangerous. 128 This
study showed that senior level male managers are:
twelve times more likely to hesitate before having a
one-on-one meeting with a female junior colleague
than with a male junior colleague, nine times more
likely to hesitate before traveling for work with a
female junior colleague than with a male junior
colleague, and six times more likely to hesitate
socializing or working one-on-one, and therefore women fear for the future of their
careers as a result of #metoo).
124 McGinley, supra note 122, at 1398.
125
Miller, supra note 121; see also Jillesa Gebhardt, How #MeToo Has
Impacted Mentorship for Women, SURVEYMONKEY, https://www.surveymonkey.com/
curiosity/mentor-her-2019/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2022) (suggesting that male refusal
to interact with women at work deprives women of formal and informal mentorship
that can aid in networking and promotions).
126 See McGinley, supra note 122.
127
McGinley, supra note 122, at 1398 (citing ABA Commission on Women in
the Legal Profession, A Current Glance at Women in the Law 2 (April 2019)).
128
McGinley, supra note 122, at 1400 (“women (especially younger ones) are
dangerous temptresses or liars (or both). A complementary stereotype is that men
cannot control their sexual urges when faced with temptation.”).
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before having a work dinner with a female junior
colleague than with a male junior colleague. 129
The media often fuels reservations surrounding mentoring
women. 130 A large percentage of opinion pieces published since
the inception of the #MeToo movement counsel men against
mentoring younger women out of concern for sexual harassment
accusations. 131 In today’s workplace, many men are willing to
reduce their interaction with women to avoid the danger of being
labeled as a harasser. Fueled by this fear, sixty percent of male
managers in the United States say that they are uncomfortable
engaging in common workplace interactions with women,
including mentoring, socializing, and having one-on-one
meetings. 132
There is a common belief to the contrary, that the
consequences of a victim bringing their story to light are more
damaging to the victim’s career than the harasser’s, and that the
consequences of reporting actually last longer for victims. 133 In
response to #MeToo’s powerful impact, opponents began
circulating the #HimToo movement—portraying the men
accused of harassment as the victims, using the same power-innumbers technique that made the #MeToo movement. 134
Although many men may act differently out of fear of false
reporting, the reality is that women are often hesitant to report
sexual misconduct out of fear of retaliation and mistreatment

McGinley, supra note 122, at 1404.
See Gebhardt, supra note 125.
131
McGinley, supra note 122, at 1405; see also Prudy Gourguechon, Why In
The World Would Men Stop Mentoring Women Post #MeToo?, FORBES (Aug. 6,
2018) https://www.forbes.com/sites/prudygourguechon/2018/08/06/why-in-the-world
-would-men-stop-mentoring-women-post-metoo/?sh=1c000e79a539;
Bret
Stephens, For Once, I’m Grateful for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/trump-kavanaugh-fordallegations.html (explaining that being falsely accused of sexual harassment is more
damaging to professional reputation than false accusations of murder).
132 Gebhardt, supra note 125.
133 Gebhardt, supra note 125.
134
Emma Grey Ellis, How #HimToo Became the Anti #MeToo of the
Kavanaugh Hearings, WIRED (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/brettkavanaugh-hearings-himtoo-metoo-christine-blasey-ford.
129
130
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from their employers. 135
Despite a lack of evidence to support the fear of false claims
of sexual misconduct, “men, particularly those in leadership
positions in the U.S., are increasingly concerned about the
possibility of false accusations of sexual harassment by female
subordinates.” 136 Former President Trump perpetrated the myth
of false reporting throughout his term, once stating that “it is a
very scary time for young men in America, where you can be
guilty of something you may not be guilty of.” 137 During a news
conference in New York, Trump fueled the resistance against the
#MeToo movement, saying that “somebody could come and say
[thirty] years ago, [twenty-five] years ago, [ten] years ago, five
years ago, he did a horrible thing to me. He did this, he did that,
he did that and, honestly, it’s a very dangerous period in our
country.” 138 In fact, Trump has often suggested that courts
should be skeptical of women’s complaints and frequently
dismisses his own impropriety as inconsequential “locker room
talk.” 139 The twenty-six women that spoke out against Trump
were ridiculed, mocked, and demeaned, and their accusations
were dismissed in the media as ploys for attention. 140 The
experiences of those who reported Trump’s misconduct prove
that the stakes for reporting sexual misconduct are high;
lowering the threshold would not disparately harm men because,
even under the current high standard, few victims seek recourse.
Additionally, some business groups say that removing the
severe or pervasive standard would “‘unnecessarily’ ramp up the
volume of legal cases and ‘diminish real complaints of
135
See, e.g., Eliza Relman, The 26 Women Who Have Accused Trump of
Sexual Misconduct, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/

women-accused-trump-sexual-misconduct-list-2017-12#tasha-dixon-and-bridgetsullivan-13 (Rachel Crooks stating that she feared losing her job if she told her
employer about her interaction with Trump).
136 McGinley, supra note 122, at 1403.
137
Jeremy Diamond, Trump Says It’s “a Very Scary Time for Young Men in
America,” CNN POL. (Oct. 2, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/
politics/trump-scary-time-for-young-men-metoo/index.html.
138

Id.

Jocelyn Frye, How to Combat Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, CTR.
AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 2017, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/women/news/2017/10/19/441046/combat-sexual-harassment-workplace.
140 Relman, supra note 135.
139

FOR
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harassment.’” 141
Many advocate for a more interventionist
approach that would involve talking to the offender and
correcting behavior rather than relying on lawsuits. 142 Others fear
that lowering the standard will transform Title VII into a general
civility code; 143 however, very few victims of sexual harassment
take formal action, as approximately ninety percent of
individuals who say that they have experienced sexual
harassment never formally reported the misconduct. 144
Moreover, as the facts in Harris suggest, confronting a harasser
may not stunt the behavior. 145
The preclusive nature of the severe or pervasive standard is
further demonstrated in Brooks, where Patricia Brooks was
sexually harassed during her evening shift as a police
Anna Gronewold, Lawmakers Focus On Setting New Standard for Sexual
POLITICO (May 24, 2019), https://www.politico.com/states/newyork/albany/story/2019/05/23/in-final-days-of-session-anti-harassment-groups-focuson-severe-or-pervasive-standard-1029121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142
Id. (“Sometimes this behavior doesn’t rise to the level of ‘oh yeah, this guy
should be sued.’”).
143
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(stating that the statutory requirements for establishing sexual harassment, whether
involving people of the same sex or not, prevent the law from becoming a civility
code); see also Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999)
(Tfoflat, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
We do not transform Title VII into a workplace ‘civility code’
when we condemn conduct less severe than that which shocks our
conscience. And when we raise the bar as high as the majority
does today, it becomes more likely that we will miss the more
subtle forms of discrimination that may still infest the workplace,
and make it more difficult for women, especially, to participate
on equal terms of equality with their male counterparts. The
sexist remark, the offensive touch, the repeated request for an
intimate outing: all of these may seem merely annoying and
relatively harmless in isolation from one another. But add them
up; see them in context; and then try to imagine what it must be
like for an employee who merely wants to come to work and
make a living to have to endure a daily barrage of sexual assault.
Then we might begin to understand the power that these “little”
sexual offenses, when considered collectively, can have in
reproducing a workplace in which women, especially, are often
still thought of by their male employees as incompetents and
playthings. (citation omitted).
144 NYC COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 2.
145
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (despite confronting Hardy,
he continued to harass plaintiff until she quit).
141

Harassment,
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dispatcher. 146
While performing her job duties, Brooks’
supervisor approached her and “placed his hand on her stomach
and commented on its softness and sexiness.” 147 Despite Brooks’
objections, the supervisor continued to forcefully touch her,
“boxing her in against the communications console as she was
taking another 911 call.” 148 He forced his hand underneath her
sweater and bra. 149 Brooks removed the supervisor’s hand and
continued to shut him down. She was only able to stop the
supervisor upon the arrival of another dispatcher. 150 Brooks
reported the incident immediately, and the supervisor resigned
shortly thereafter. 151 Upon reporting, it was established that the
supervisor was a repeat offender: many other female dispatchers
had been subjected to similar treatment but none had reported
the misconduct. 152 After seeking psychological treatment due to
difficulty recovering from the incident, Brooks brought a claim
for hostile work environment. 153 Following a six-month leave of
absence, Brooks returned to work and was ostracized and
mistreated by male supervisors. 154 Accordingly, Brooks was
essentially forced to quit her job and never returned. 155
The district court held that the conduct by Brooks’ male
supervisors was “not severe enough to give rise to a hostile work
environment claim,” which led Brooks to appeal. 156 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, determining that, because Brooks could only
rely on the single instance of sexual harassment to support her
hostile work environment claim, the misconduct was not severe
enough to be actionable. 157 In rendering its decision, the court
referred to the standard set out in Harris, writing that, “Brooks
must show that her ‘workplace [was] permeated with
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921–22 (9th Cir; 2000).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brooks, 229 F.3d at 922.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 926–27 (“If a single incident can ever suffice to support a hostile work

environment claim, the incident must be extremely severe.”).
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discriminatory intimidation . . . that [was] sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create
an abusive working environment.’” 158 While the court reasoned
that Brooks had asserted sufficient facts to support the subjective
prong of the hostile work environment analysis, it held that the
supervisor’s conduct did not satisfy the objectively reasonable
prong. 159 The court’s reasoning referred to other cases decided
under the Harris standard and recognized that physical injuries
resulting from a single incident may be sufficient enough to meet
the objectively severe standard; because Brooks had only suffered
psychological injury, the court deemed Brooks’ claim to be
insufficient. 160 The court reaffirmed its prior holding in Meritor,
writing that “an isolated incident of harassment by a co-worker
will rarely (if ever) give rise to a reasonable fear that sexual
harassment has become a permanent feature of the employment
relationship.” 161 The Brooks decision demonstrates how easily a
severe or pervasive standard can jettison claims because large
swaths of conduct are not severe enough to meet the threshold.
Similarly, other cases illustrate the difficulty of establishing
harassment as adequately pervasive to support a cause of
action. 162 For example, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama did not consider twenty separate
incidents of harassment by a supervisor, occurring over a yearand-a-half-long period, to be pervasive enough to support a
claim. 163 Several of these incidents included comments about an
employee’s buttocks; making lewd, sexual jokes; telling the same
employee that he would be her “sugar daddy;” and suggesting
that other workers would want to see her “down on all fours.” 164
The court went on to improperly suggest that the harassment
would need to have occurred daily in order to satisfy the
158
159
160
161

Brooks, 229 F.3d at 923.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 926–27.
Id. at 924 (“In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to say that a

reasonable victim would feel that the terms and conditions of her employment have
changed as a result of the misconduct.”).
162 See Williams v. United Launch All., LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1304 (N.D.
Ala. 2018).
163
164

Id.
Id. at 1303.
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governing standard, meaning that even repetitive harassment is
often dismissed as not actionable. 165
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Mitchell v. Pope 166 labeled a
supervisor’s behavior as insufficiently “severe” to attach liability
because of the infrequency of the conduct. 167 There, the plaintiff
pointed to sixteen specific instances of offensive conduct by her
supervisor occurring throughout her four years of employment. 168
Though most incidents involved “offensive utterances,” the
employee’s supervisor touched her (or attempted to touch her)
on multiple occasions, during which he attempted to kiss her, lift
her, and rub up against her. 169 The court took a dismissive,
employer-friendly view of the conduct, discounting the superior’s
action as “horseplay” that could not qualify as sexual harassment
because “some was not sex-based.” 170 Notably, this case is
explicitly referenced in a section of the Act that describes
erroneous analysis of the severe or pervasive standard,
supporting the fact that even conduct that satisfies the high
severe or pervasive standard is frequently discounted or
excused. 171
The courts’ skepticism in the referenced cases demonstrates
the need for a different standard to assess what actually makes a
work experience harmful to workers—specifically, female
workers. 172 The severe or pervasive standard is a product of
judicial interpretation, and is found nowhere in Title VII. 173
While it cannot be said that Title VII was written so intentionally
broad as to allow for such judicial interpretation, it is clear that
divergent understandings and inconsistent applications of the
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 1304.
189 F. App'x 911 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 913.
Id.
Id.

H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(a)(18)(E) (2019).
See Chesier v. On Q Fin. Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 918, 925–27 (D. Ariz. 2019)
(relying on the decision in Brooks to support that a single incident of harassment
must be “extremely severe” to be actionable and indicating rape was the type of
conduct that met this standard. The court reasoned that a single incident can only
support a hostile work environment claim when the victim was violently raped or
endured some similar form of physical assault).
173 Sperino & Thomas, supra note 72.
171
172
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standard have shut out an enormous class of victims from legal
recognition and redress. 174 For example, in Brooks, the plaintiff
bravely reported her traumatizing assault, which other women
who were assaulted by the same supervisor could not do. 175 Had a
more victim-friendly standard been in place, courts in cases like
Brooks may have ruled differently by recognizing the gravity of
the harm inflicted upon victims. Instead, Justice Ginsburg’s
concurrence in Harris reflects a better standard. 176 Justice
Ginsburg did not perceive her view as inconsistent with the
majority opinion, but instead proposed a lower threshold to allow
more victims, regardless of whether the conduct satisfied the
Harris factors, 177 to come forward. 178
B. The Solution: “Be HEARD”
In light of the faulty application of the severe or pervasive
standard, binding legislation explicitly laying out an applicable
standard with guidelines is required to lead to more consistent
rulings. The Act was introduced in Congress on April 9, 2019. 179
The path to equality in the workplace requires a solution that
See Debra S. Katz & Hannah Alejandro, Opinion: Blue States are Leading
in Sexual Harassment Reforms. Red States are Leaving Women Behind, THE
174

WASHINGTON POST (July 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bluestates-are-leading-in-sexual-harassment-reforms-red-states-are-leaving-womenbehind/2019/07/23/8858bab2-acb5-11e9-a0c9-6d2d7818f3da_story.html
(stating
that the severe or pervasive standard “often allows judges to reflect their own
gender bias and their own personal sense of what conditions might affect their
ability to do their jobs when deciding cases.”); see also New Jersey Office of the
Attorney General Div. on Civil Rights (“DCR”), Preventing and Eliminating Sexual
Harassment
in
New
Jersey,
20
(February
2020),
http://d31hzlhk6di2h5.cloudfront.net/20200218/78/65/41/97/227d55a39cbf6d8ffa5e
d7d9/Preventing_and_Eliminating_Sexual_Harassment_in_New_Jersey.pdf
(describing how “the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard prevents survivors from
reporting or successfully prosecuting claims” because of the “belief that the
harassment they suffered won’t constitute sexual harassment under the law.”).
175 Brooks, 229 F.3d 917, 921–22 (9th Cir. 2000).
176 Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 23 ("the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance").
178 Johnson, supra note 22, at 99–100; see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (holding
that so long as a work environment is hostile, there is no need for it to also be
psychologically injurious).
179 Sekaran, supra note 25.
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adequately addresses the widespread presence of sexual
harassment. Very few states outside of New York and California
have made efforts to employ additional protections, most of
which were liberal, progressive (“blue”) states such as Maryland,
Illinois, and Vermont. 180 Accordingly, a federal solution that
revises the severe or pervasive standard is necessary. While the
Act currently lacks adequate support to pass in the 117th
Congress, addressing the sexual harassment epidemic “must
remain an urgent priority and should be relentlessly sought as a
nonpartisan effort to deliver basic constitutional rights.” 181 The
Act offers a detailed roadmap for judges and employers to follow
to determine whether specific conduct constitutes unlawful
harassment, which will lessen the frequent excusal of abusive
conduct and encourage the pursuit of legal redress. 182
The findings in the Act state that harassment is a “persistent
and significant problem in the workplace in the United States[,]”
and that the purpose of Congress’ enactment of Title VII was to
provide broad protection from bias in the workplace. 183 The Act
clarifies the revised threshold for hostile work environment
claims, disregarding the severe or pervasive standard and instead
requiring only that the conduct “ha[ve] the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.” 184 The Act also promotes consistency in its
application, elaborating on the factors that courts should
consider on a case-by-case basis to avoid misapplication and
emphasis on solely the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct. 185
Some of the guidelines listed in the Act include that: (1) the

Katz & Alejandro, supra note 174.
Katz & Alejandro, supra note 174.
182
Vania Leveille & Lenora M. Lapidus, The BE HEARD Act Will Overhaul
Workplace Harassment Laws, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:15 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/be-heard-actwill-overhaul-workplace-harassment-laws.
183 H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(a)(1)–(3) (2019).
184 H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(a)(6)(C) (2019).
185
H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(a)(7), § 204(a)(15) (2019) (stating that courts
should “look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such
as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred”).
180
181
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determination be made based on the record in its entirety; 186 and
(2) incidents of harassment be considered in the aggregate,
rather than in isolation. 187 The Act also specifies factors for courts
to consider when determining whether conduct constitutes
workplace harassment that is neither exhaustive nor
determinative. 188 These factors include:
(i) the frequency of the conduct; (ii) the duration of
the conduct; (iii) the location where the conduct
occurred; (iv) the number of individuals engaged
in the conduct.; (v) the nature of the conduct,
which may include physical, verbal, pictorial, or
visual conduct, and conduct that occurs in person
or is transmitted, such as electronically; (vi)
whether the conduct is threatening; (vii) any power
differential between the alleged harasser and the
person allegedly harassed; and (viii) any use of
epithets, slurs, or other conduct that is humiliating
or degrading. 189
Codification of these factors allows for more thorough and
consistent consideration of hostile work environment claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

A change to the current federal standard governing sexual
harassment law is necessary to penalize harassers, who continue
to set victims’ careers back through their traumatizing conduct.
Since its inception, the severe or pervasive standard has
promoted inconsistency in its application. Judges have failed to
hold harassers accountable for dehumanizing conduct, leaving
victims without a proper remedy. The modifications made by
states such as New York and California prove that a lower
threshold to bring an actionable claim is appropriate.
H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(c)(3)(A) (2019) (emphasizing that “a single
incident may constitute workplace harassment”).
187 H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(c)(3)(B) (2019).
188 H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. § 204(c)(3)(C) (2019).
186

189

Id.
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Accordingly, in light of the progress of the #MeToo movement,
the severe or pervasive standard set forth in Meritor must be
abandoned in order to better protect victims. Currently, victims
continue to be harmed by the demanding Meritor standard, and
the passage of the Act will provide relief for victims of sexual
harassment by encompassing a wider range of harmful conduct.

